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BEHAVIORAL MODEL OF GAMBLING
Mark R. Dixon
Southern Illinois University

Jeffrey N. Weatherly
University of North Dakota
___________________

The integrative behavioral model of gambling (Weatherly & Dixon, 2007) was forwarded as an initial attempt to provide a unified and coherent behavioral account for
gambling behavior and problems. There were
several reasons for making this attempt. For
one, no such attempt had been made to date
despite a large literature on gambling behavior existing outside behavioral psychology.
A second reason was that such a model could
serve as a springboard for researchers seeking
external funding for their work, as funding
agencies frequently prefer research proposals
that are couched within a theoretical framework. Thirdly, proposing such a model could
potentially spur research in support or in opposition of the model. Despite the excellent
critiques and criticisms of the integrative behavioral model of gambling, each of our initial aims still has merit.
The commentaries found in this issue highlight a variety of topics that our paper raised.
Some topical comments were critical, while

ly, and conclude with a final synopsis of our
position.
The commentary of Dymond and Whelan
highlights what we believe is a critical feature
of our model: verbal behavior. As Dymond
and Whelan note, a direct contingency approach will only get us so far in understanding the complex human behavior of gambling. While animal models do in fact hold
utility (see Petry, Madden, & Roll; Reilly &
Fox), we do not believe that they can completely describe human behavior.
Dymond and Whelan suggest that one
weakness in the proposed model is that we do
not make clear our exact definition of verbal
behavior. Failing to do so was not an oversight on our part, mostly because doing so
would be a major undertaking in and of itself.
For sake of brevity and to minimize controversy, we simply stated “verbal behavior.”
No distinction was made between a Skinnerian (Skinner, 1957) or post-Skinnerian
(Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2002) definition of the term. While we would tend to
side with the latter definition, as recent research suggests that such a definition holds
utility to understanding choices gamblers
make (e.g., Zlomke & Dixon, 2006), we did
not want to limit our model to a certain set of
pre-analytic assumptions. Although we agree
with Dymond and Whelan that Skinner’s de-
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others were complementary. In this response
we will analyze each commentary individual30
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finition is too broad for robust empirical research, we leave the quibbling of the definition to the researchers and the findings that lie
ahead.
Cooper as well as Reilly and Fox have
noted that the jury is still out on the causal
nature of delay discounting, and how discounting rates may be predictive of pathological gambling. We agree, and while Cooper’s
quote of our manuscript is indeed correct, we
would add that our intention was never to
imply that a “cause” which determined pathology was an individual’s discounting of
future delayed rewards. Instead, the preference for sooner smaller consequences, are a
factor in a larger behavioral context that the
person interacts within. Smaller rewards may
be the low probability outcome of the gamble,
avoiding paying of bills for more cash inhand, or robbing a neighbor to finance the
gamble. A behavioral repertoire consisting of
repeated choices for sooner smaller less advantageous reinforcers that sustain gambling,
we believe contributes to pathological gambling. Nothing in this argument is circular as
noted by Reilly and Fox, and our use of the
term “cause” was chosen for widespread readability rather than the perhaps more technically correct description of a participatory
factor in an interbehavioral field of interaction
between the organism and the environment.
With the primary aim of our model being
adoption outside behavior analysis, we see the
latter, more precise description damaging to
that primary aim.
Lyons raises two primary concerns with
our model. The first is our implied minimized
importance of intermittent reinforcement.
The second is our suggested dismissal of reinforcement history. We believe that Lyons can
rest assured that both are important to understanding the behavior of gambling from our
perspective. There is no doubt that we value
both intermittent reinforcement and a history
of reinforcement in our model. Our point was
never exclusion of these two variables in un-
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derstanding gambling behavior, but rather
emphasizing that they are by no means the
exhaustive causes of the behavior. In response to Lyons’ question of the necessity of
establishing operations such as age or socioeconomic status in our model, we think that
the data will be the best determiner of their
inclusion. Large-group-design research has
documented differences between factors such
as age, socio-economic status, and race (see
Petry, 2005 for a review). Whether changes
such as age and financial statue within the life
of an individual gambler makes a difference
in mitigating their propensity to gamble; only
the data will tell the tale. Lyons ends his
commentary with the following question:
“How do we account for individual differences in young, male, poor, single, drug-using
minority members who do not become pathological gamblers, and older, female, married,
abstinent white women who do?” He then
answers his own question with: “The answer,
I suspect, will have something to do with reinforcement history.” We have no argument
with his answer to the question, as ours would
be the same. The only modification we would
have would be to emphasize the word “something”, as it is far from everything.
The commentary of Reilly and Fox mentioned that it was unclear in our paper if it
was a description of pathological or nonpathological gambling. From our perspective,
it is both. The only distinction between the
two from our position is a matter of degree.
Pathological gamblers are not a separate population, but rather simply those who engage in
the behavior of gambling more often than
those who do not or are not considered pathological gamblers. Rate alone is not exclusive
of “pathology” as the outcomes of gambling
on the rest of the individual’s life are important as well. The differences between the two
groups are often categorical, but we would
consider them quantitative in nature.
The final issue we wish to respond to is
that of our potential over-emphasis on the role
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of verbal behavior and thus a downplaying of
programmed contingencies. Petry, Madden
and Roll state with respect to differences between pathological and non-pathological
gamblers that “Given these differences, the
authors (Weatherly and Dixon) suggest that
differential sensitivities to gambling contingencies of reinforcement are not in the environment but in human language.” This quote
may in fact highlight a common misconception of human language – that language is not
in the environment, but rather somewhere
within the person him/herself. A similar concern was echoed by Lyons that somehow a
choice needs to be made by theorists between
the two variables: language and contingencies). We do not believe that such a choice is
necessary. Language is behavior in the environment, and is developed, maintained, and
extinguished via environmental contingencies, just like nonverbal behavior.
Pointing to the consequence of verbal behavior is more difficult than that of nonverbal
behavior, but nonetheless, both are behavior
maintained by the environment. Our embrace
of the role of verbal behavior is not a dismissal of pure programmed contingency control.
Instead, it is an acknowledgement of the
complexity of human behavior. Dismissing
verbal behavior in hopes of parsimony in explaining nonhuman behavior leads us further
away from the goals of behavioral science –
prediction and control. Petry et al. may
doubt the strength of verbal rules or instruction to control the behavior of the gambler, as
if they could, “then treating pathological
gambling could be greatly simplified; therapists would simply instruct them to stop” (Petry et al.). We agree just telling someone to
stop gambling will not solve the problem, as
histories of rule following and contingency
control are more complex and historical in
nature than the current verbal utterance being
emitted at that moment. However, if a lottery
player continues to play week after week and
has never won the lottery, appeals to pro-
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grammed reinforcement for playing (i.e.,
winning) seem substantially inadequate.
Thus, we believe that both the environmental
consequences for rule following (social reinforcement from the speaker, more effective
contact with the environment, or momentarily
altering the reinforcing value of the consequence – see Hayes, 1987 for a full description of the various environmental consequences of rules) and the environmental consequences for non-verbal behavior are at play
each and every time a gambler gambles.
We are hopeful that debates over these issues will be promoted, rather than ended, by
our comments here. Clearly the behavioral
perspective has much to offer in the way of
understanding the very important issue of
gambling behavior and pathological gambling. If our model can in any way forward
that perspective, then we will consider it a
success.
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THE ROLE OF “EXPERIENCE” WHEN PEOPLE GAMBLE ON
THREE DIFFERENT VIDEO-POKER GAMES
Jeffrey N. Weatherly, David P. Austin, & Katie Farwell
University of North Dakota

The present experiment was designed to determine if and how experience might
alter individuals’ gambling when playing video poker. Twelve self-identified
“experienced” poker players and 12 self-identified “novices” were recruited to
play video poker across three different sessions. A different game (i.e., Jacks or
Better, Bonus Poker, or Loose Deuces) was played in each session, with these
games differing in what strategies were optimal. “Experienced” participants
displayed more knowledge of poker than their “novice” counterparts. However,
the only observed difference in the gambling between “experienced” and “novice” players was in how much they bet per hand, with “experienced” players
betting higher amounts. Participants in both groups made frequent errors when
playing, with error rates increasing when wild cards were introduced into the
game. Self-reported strategies suggested that some participants held fallacious
views about the games and/or betting strategies, although the presence of fallacious views did not appear to differ between groups. The present results indicate that experience may not necessarily lead to better play and, if anything, may
be detrimental to the player if it leads to increased betting without an increase in
the chance of winning. The results also suggest that, although players may alter
their strategies when playing different poker games, they do not do so optimally.
Keywords: experience, video poker, gambling

____________________
Experience plays a major explanatory role
within behavioral psychology. This concept
falls under the guise of “reinforcement history” within a strict behavioral framework. The
idea that experience is a critical aspect of understanding behavior, however, has not gone
unnoticed in other fields of psychology. For
instance, one can find large amounts of research conducted on the influence of “knowledge” or “expertise” on different types

of behaviors. The study of how experience
affects behavior has actually resulted in some
of the more widely known research results in
psychology. For example, de Groot (1965,
1966) attempted to identify the influence of
expertise by comparing the behavior of expert
chess players (e.g., grand masters) to that of
novices (e.g., class A chess players). Both
types of player were shown a chessboard on
which pieces were arranged in a realistic
manner such as one might find in a partially
completed game. Participants were asked to
identify the best move for the next turn given
that arrangement of pieces. Perhaps surprisingly, players of both skill levels were fairly
equivalent at identifying what the best move
would be. The major difference between the
different skill levels was the number of potential moves explored by the different players.
The masters went through fewer possible derivations than the novices before concluding
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on a move.
Perhaps more famous within the memory
literature is a study by Chase and Simon
(1973). These researchers found that chess
grand masters were quite adept at recreating
configurations of chess pieces from memory
even when given only brief exposure to the
original configuration. This ability, however,
seemed to be connected to whether or not the
pieces were configured realistically as one
would find in an actual game of chess or had
been arranged randomly. In fact, when shown
configurations of pieces randomly placed on
the board, the grand masters were no better
than novices at recalling their positions. Such
findings spurred a great deal of subsequent
research, some of which has documented that,
in some instances, expertise may actually be
detrimental (e.g., Castel, McCabe, Roediger,
& Heitman, 2007).
Within a cognitive framework, results from
research on expertise have been interpreted in
terms of cognitive processing and the organization of memory. Within a behavioral
framework, however, they can be interpreted
in terms of shaping and stimulus control.
That is, one could speculate that the results of
de Groot (1965, 1966) occurred because,
through extensively playing against top-notch
competition, experts’ behavior of going
through certain progressions of potential
moves has been reinforced while going
through other progressions has either been
extinguished or punished. Perhaps due to
their lack of experience, novices may not discriminate between productive and nonproductive progressions and thus may go
through more of them.
Likewise, one could speculate that the results of Chase and Simon (1973) demonstrate
that the configurations of chess pieces experienced by masters during actual play had
come to serve as discriminative stimuli. Behavior such as recalling the position of the
pieces was possible when the pieces were arranged in a particular fashion. The same be-
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havior was inhibited, or at least not facilitated,
when the pieces were differently arranged.
Both results have implications beyond
chess play or the study of memory. They
suggest that the behavior of game players are
altered through continued play of the game. It
is commonly assumed that this experience
will enhance play. However, that is not necessarily the only possible outcome (e.g., Castel et al., 2007). For instance, one could speculate that chess players who continually play
against lesser competition might have their
behavior shaped in non-optimal ways. This
non-optimal play would not be exposed until
playing against a more advanced opponent.
Likewise, it is possible that stimulus control
would develop with continued game play, but
that is no guarantee that the stimuli that come
to exert control over behavior are the most
optimal in terms of maximizing performance.
These possibilities take on added significance when applied to gambling on games of
chance. Many games of chance (e.g., poker,
blackjack, video poker) involve strategies that
can enhance one’s chance of winning and/or
minimize one’s chance of losing. One might
assume that continued play at such games
would shape appropriate strategies. However,
that may not be the case. Because of the element of chance present in these games, proper
decisions do not always result in winning.
Likewise, poor or improper decisions would
not always result in a loss. In fact, poor decisions might reduce the likelihood of winning,
but would they would still result in the player
winning at least intermittently. This intermittent reinforcement might in turn enhance the
likelihood of poor decision making in the future. To our knowledge, research on these
possibilities does not exist within the gambling literature.
It is therefore not clear that experience
would necessarily equate to improved play
across time.
Likewise, some games of
chance, such as poker and video poker, have
many different variations that can be played.
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These variations involve the identical or nearly identical stimuli (i.e., the same cards and
winning card combinations). However, because different games might require different
strategies for optimal play, performance may
be inhibited if certain stimuli (e.g., card combinations) come to exert stimulus control over
players’ gambling behavior (e.g., promoting a
certain play when dealt a specific type of
poker hand). In short, although intuition
would suggest that experience should enhance
ability, it may actually inhibit it.
The present experiment was designed to
assess if and how experience might influence
gambling when participants played a videopoker simulation. Individuals who self identified as “experienced” or “novice” poker players were recruited. These individuals were
then staked with money to play three different
versions of video poker across three separate
sessions. All three games were variations of
five-card draw, but differed in terms of what
were the best cards to hold or discard on specific hands. If experience promotes play, then
experienced players should outperform novice
players. Furthermore, one might also predict
that players with greater knowledge of the
game of poker would alter their play across
games as the odds, and thus the optimal strategy, changed. On the other hand, if experience does not necessarily shape the “optimal” pattern of play, then one might not expect
experienced players to outperform novice
players. Likewise, if players’ behavior is under the control of stimuli across the different
games, then performance across games should
differ because the same hands might require a
different decision depending on which game
was being played.

METHOD
Participants
Twenty four individuals were recruited
from the psychology department participant
pool at the University of North Dakota. Participant recruitment proceeded in two phases.

https://repository.stcloudstate.edu/agb/vol1/iss1/8

The first phase recruited people who self
identified as “experienced” poker players (not
limited to just video poker). This phase was
initiated first because it was anticipated that it
would be more difficult to recruit “experienced” players than “novices.” The second
phase targeted individuals who self identified
as “novice” poker players.
For both phases, recruitment information
was posted in the psychology department
building that targeted individuals who were
“experienced” or “novice,” respectively, poker players. No other poker-related information was presented beyond indicating the targeted level of experience for each group. To
participate in either group, individuals were
required to be at least 21 years of age and had
to score below five on the South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS; Lesieur & Blume,
1987).
Twelve participants were recruited for
each group (Experienced: 6 males, 6 females;
Novice: 5 males, 7 females). The mean age
of participants in the Experienced group was
28.17 years (SD = 5.70). The mean age of
participants in the Novice group was 28.42
years (SD = 13.44).
Materials and Apparatus
All participants were asked to complete a
demographic questionnaire during their participation. The questionnaire asked the participant’s sex, age, marital status, and annual
income. This information was collected because research on gambling (see Petry, 2005)
indicates that each of these factors is correlated to the presence of pathological gambling. The present procedure was designed to
exclude pathological gamblers from participation. However, it remained possible that these
factors could potentially be associated with
differences in the gambling behavior of the
“experienced” and “novice” participants and
were therefore measured.
Participants were also asked to answer four
questions meant to determine their familiarity
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with the game of poker. The four questions
were (with answers in parentheses): What
cards are necessary for a full house (Three
cards of one face value and two cards of
another face value)? What hands beat a full
house (Straight flush, Four of a kind, & Royal
flush)? What is a set (Three cards of one face
value)? In a wild-card game, what is the best
hand (a natural Royal flush)? These questions
were meant to determine whether the selfidentified experienced players differed in their
knowledge of poker relative to the selfidentified novice players. Participants’ answers to these questions did not alter to which
group they had been assigned through self
identification.
The next task was the SOGS (Lesieur &
Blume, 1987). The SOGS is a 20-item questionnaire that focuses on the individual’s
gambling history. It is the most widely used
screening measure (see Petry, 2005), with a
score of five or more on the SOGS suggesting
the possible presence of pathological gambling. Participants who scored five or above
were dismissed before the gambling session
and their demographic data were not included
in the data analyses. Dismissing these participants ensured that individuals with pathology
were not allowed to engage in their pathology.
Lastly, after playing each type of poker
game, participants were asked to provide a
written response to the following statement:
Please describe the strategy you used when
playing the last game. No information on
strategy was conveyed to the participant and
the individual was afforded the opportunity to
be as explicit or succinct as he or she deemed
necessary.
Participants completed the above materials
and played the video-poker game in windowless room that measured approximately 2 m
by 2 m. The room contained a table and two
chairs, with a personal computer situated on
the table. The video-poker software (Zamzow
Software Solutions, 2003) on the computer
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allowed for a variety of five-card-draw poker
games to be played. The present experiment
utilized three specific games. One (Jacks)
was “Jacks or Better,” which returned the
player’s bet for a pair of Jacks or higher. A
Flush was paid at 6-1 odds, a Full house was
paid at 9-1 odds, and a Four of a kind at 25-1
odds. The second game (Bonus) was “Bonus
Poker,” which was similar to “Jacks or Better” with the exception that it returned 5-1 for
a Flush and 8-1 for a Full house. It also paid
three different amounts for Four of a kind,
with 25-1 odds for Fives through Kings, 40-1
odds for Twos, Threes, and Fours, and 80-1
odds for Aces. The third game (Deuces) was
“Loose Deuces,” which was five-card draw
with Twos wild. This game required at least
Three of a kind to return the player’s bet and
included payouts for Five of a kind (15-1
odds), a Royal flush with Twos (25-1 odds),
and Four twos (500-1 odds).
These specific games were chosen for two
reasons. The first was that they sometimes
differed in what was the “best play” when
dealt the same hand of cards. For instance, if
the player was dealt the 7 of diamonds, 8 of
diamonds, Jack of diamonds, 9 of hearts, and
the King of hearts, the best play would be to
hold the 7, 8, and Jack if one is playing Jacks
or Deuces. However, the best return on Bonus would come by holding the Jack and
King. If the player was dealt the 10 of clubs,
Jack of diamonds, Queen of diamonds, Ace of
diamonds, and Ace of hearts, then the best
play would be to hold the two Aces if one was
playing Jacks or Bonus. However, the best
return on Deuces would come if one held the
Jack, Queen, and Ace of diamonds. In terms
of similarity, the best play was most often the
same between Jacks and Bonus. To play
Deuces optimally, one would need to take an
alternate strategy than with the other two
games fairly frequently. The second reason
was that these three games are commonly
found in major commercial casinos in the
United States. Thus, if one was an expe-
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rienced video poker play, it is reasonable to
speculate that one might have played each
type of game.
The software recorded the number of times
during each session that the player deviated
from the optimal play. The optimal play was
the one which maximized the player’s rate of
return given that particular hand. Nonoptimal plays were recorded as errors. The
software allowed for errors to be categorized
from minor to major, depending on the deviation in rate of return from the optimal play.
For purposes of the present study, however,
plays were categorized as accurate (i.e., optimal play) or inaccurate (i.e., any play that
was not optimal). Players were not notified as
to what the best play was for a given hand or
as to whether they had made the optimal
choice. The only information provided to
participants was the pay table that appeared
on the screen above where the cards were displayed.
Procedure
Participants were run individually. Upon
arrival, the researcher initiated the informedconsent process. Once the participant had
provided consent, he or she was asked to
complete the SOGS. Next, the participant
was asked to complete the remaining forms
while the researcher scored the SOGS. If the
participant scored five or more on the SOGS,
then the session ended after the forms were
completed. In this event, which occurred
once for a female participant recruited for the
Experienced group, the participant was debriefed, given course extra credit (if applicable), and dismissed.
The researcher then situated the participant
in front of the computer and read the following instructions:
You will now be given the opportunity to play a
computer generated, five-card-draw poker
game. You will be staked with 100 credits.
Each credit is worth 5 cents. Thus, you are being staked with $5. You may bet up to five cre-
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dits per play and your goal should be to end the
session with as many credits as you can. You
may quit (i.e., end the session) at any time by
informing the researcher that you wish to end
the session. The session will end when a) you
quit playing, b) you reach 0 credits, or 15 minutes have elapsed. You will be paid in cash at
the end of today’s session for the number of
credits you have accumulated or have remaining. Do you have any questions?

Questions were answered by repeating the
above instructions. The participant then
played the video-poker game until one of the
three criteria to end that session was met. The
researcher then asked the participant to complete the form pertaining to the strategy the
player had just used. During that time, the
researcher readied the next type of game. The
researcher then read the identical instructions.
This process was repeated until the participant
had played all three poker games and had
completed the strategy forms after each.
Upon completion, the participant was debriefed, paid, provided course extra credit (if
applicable), and dismissed. The order that
participants experienced the three different
poker games varied randomly across participants.

RESULTS
Data from participants in each group were
compared on the measures of age, marital status, annual income, SOGS score, and the
number of poker-knowledge questions correctly answered. The only significant difference between the groups was observed with
the poker knowledge questions (F(1, 22) =
8.17, p=.001, 2=.374), with the participants
in the experienced group answering significantly more questions correctly than participants in the novice group1. Results from
these analyses, and all that follow, were considered significant at p<.05.
Figure 1 presents the results from the video-poker sessions. The graphs in Figure 1 did
not take into account how sessions ended.
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That is, results were calculated across the entire session regardless of whether the session
ended before or after 15 min. Sessions lasting
less than 15 min occurred on at least 10 occasions because either participants had lost all
100 credits or because they chose to terminate
the session. The majority of sessions, however, were 15 min in length.
The data in Figure 1 were analyzed by
conducting a two-way (Experience by Game)
multivariate mixed-model analysis of variance. In this analysis, poker experience
served as the grouping factor and type of
game served as the repeated measure. The
four measures presented in Figure 1 were the
dependent variables. In the omnibus analysis,
both the main effect of experience (Pillai’s
Trace = .453, F(4, 19) = 3.93, p=.017,
2=.453) and game were significant (Pillai’s
Trace = .640, F(8, 15) = 3.33, p=.021,
2=.640). These results suggest that the experienced group played differently than the novice group and that both groups played differently across the three different games, respectively. The interaction between experience and game was not significant.
Follow-up univariate tests indicated that
the main effect of experience was limited to
the average bet size per hand (see second
graph from bottom in Figure 1). Specifically,
participants in the experienced group wagered
more credits per hand than did participants in
the novice group (F(1, 22) = 12.92, p=.002,
2=.370). Of the other measures, only the total number of credits bet across the session
approached statistical significance (F(1, 22) =
2.78, p=.110, 2=.112).
Follow-up univariate tests indicated that
the main effect of game was limited to the
__________

accuracy of play (see bottom graph in Figure
1; F(2, 44) = 8.87, p=.001, 2=.287). Furthermore, the linear polynomial contrast was
significant for this measure (F(1, 22) = 23.14,
p<.001, 2=.513), indicating that accuracy decreased across the Jacks, Bonus, and Deuces
sessions, in that order.
Responses on the strategy questionnaires
completed after each poker session were analyzed, but few participants provided much, if
any, detailed information. Completed questionnaires were screened for accurate and inaccurate statements. Fallacious comments
were sometimes observed and fell into two
general categories, faulty betting strategies
(e.g. “One time I bet 5 and lost, so I stopped
doing that” or “When I noticed my luck was
high, I would switch to betting 2 credits instead of one”) and a lack of understanding of
the game (e.g., “I also started trying for bigger
hands because they give a higher payout” or
“I tried going for more advanced things like
flushes, straights and full houses”). These
latter comments are fallacious because what
hands one attempts to obtain should be dictated by the cards one is dealt, not by the
payoff table alone. Statistical analyses were
conducted on the frequency counts of the
number of participants in each group who reported fallacious strategies and the total number of fallacious comments per participant
regarding their play in each session. No significant differences were found.
Most, but not all, participants in both
groups expressed that they altered their strategy across the different games (e.g., “I didn’t
keep as many face cards because two of a
kind didn’t do anything”). Again, however,
there were no statistically significant differences between the groups in that respect.

1

It should be noted that additional statistical analyses
were conducted that coded data based on how well
participants answered the questions on poker knowledge instead of by self-identified group. These analyses also failed to produce significant effects of
“knowledge” beyond finding differences in average bet
size per hand.
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DISCUSSION
The present experiment was designed to
investigate whether experienced poker players
would play better (or differently) when
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Figure 1. Presented are the means for each group on four different measures of behavior
when playing each type of poker game. The error bars represent one standard error of the mean.
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playing video poker relative to inexperienced
players. It was also designed to assess whether players would alter their playing strategies
across games that required different strategies
to play them perfectly. In some ways, the results were both intriguing and alarming. Experienced players did not play better than novice players. In fact, they only differed from
novices in that they made larger bets than did
the novices. Although the qualitative data
suggest that players attempted to change
strategies across the different games, these
attempts did not optimize their chances of
winning. Both experienced and novice poker
players responded well below 100% accuracy,
with the worst accuracy rates being observed
when wild cards were introduced into the
game.
One obvious criticism of the present study
was that, although it recruited “experienced”
poker players, the participants may not have
been “expert” players. The fact that the experienced participants played no better than the
novice participants clearly supports this criticism, as does the fact that the accuracy rate of
the experienced players averaged less than
70% across the three games. In the present
study, participants who self identified as “experienced” or “novice” poker players were
placed in those respective groups without
question before their poker knowledge was
assessed. Thus, it is legitimate to believe that
different results would have been observed if
professional poker players (i.e., experts) had
been recruited rather than self-identified experienced players. Indeed, past research that
reported differences between experienced and
inexperienced participants either used formalized criteria to delineate the different groups
before (e.g., de Groot, 1965, 1966) or after
(e.g., Castel et al., 2007) performance data
were collected . The present study did neither
and it is therefore possible that there was a
sizeable overlap in skill between the groups.1
These criticisms notwithstanding, the
present results still have value. Participants in
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the “experienced” group self identified as experienced poker players and it seems reasonable to assume that they therefore believed that
their “experience” made them different from
novice players. Furthermore, the knowledge
base of the experienced players did differ significantly from that of the novice players as
measured by the four-item questionnaire administered during the session. Thus, although
the present “experienced” participants may
not have been poker experts, they did present
themselves as experienced poker players and
displayed an enhanced knowledge of the
game relative to the novice players.
Unfortunately, these differences did not
translate into superior play. Rather, experience only functioned to increase how much
participants wagered per hand. There are
several possible explanations for why this
outcome was observed. One might be tied to
knowledge level. It is the case that one’s
chances of winning on each of the three
games are maximized if one bets the maximum number of credits possible (i.e., 5) versus any other amount (see below for an explanation). It is possible that “experienced”
players recognized this fact. However, this
explanation can be questioned. Although experienced players had a significantly higher
average bet size than the novice players, the
experienced players still averaged well below
the maximum bet size (which is needed to
maximize the chances of winning). Furthermore, the self reports of strategies used did
not provide a single instance in which a player identified that it was in his or her best interest to bet the maximum number of credits.
A second possibility is that participants’
experience served to enhance their confidence
in winning and therefore they wagered more
money per hand than did novice participants.
In behavioral terms, experience may have
served as a setting event (Kantor & Smith,
1975). Setting events are conditions that alter
the reinforcing consequences of a behavior on
a relatively permanent basis. It is possible
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that experience did so by altering the consequences associated with betting.
A third, but not last, possibility is that experienced participants have habituated
(Thompson & Spencer, 1966) to betting small
amounts. This process would lead experienced players to bet larger and larger
amounts to achieve the same level of stimulation as before. The present study did not ascertain why participants bet the number of
tokens per hand that they did, so each of these
possibilities remain open.
The failure to find a difference between
experienced and novice players in accuracy of
play is partially consistent with the results of
de Groot (1965, 1966), who found that expert
and non-expert chess players would often
come to the same decision on which play to
make. However, de Groot reported that experts did so more quickly (or at least explored
fewer alternatives) than non-experts. This
latter finding was absent in the present data.
If the experienced players made decisions
more quickly than the novice players, then
one would predict that they would have been
able to play more hands per session than the
novices. That was not the case. The difference in the number of hands played was not
significant and, if anything, the experienced
players averaged fewer hands per session than
the novice players. De Groot also reported
that both experts and novices ultimately came
to a good decision. That was often not the
case in the present experiment, as both experienced and novice players made frequent
mistakes.
Failing to show that experience had a positive impact on video-poker play has some
negative implications. If experience does not
enhance play, but rather makes people more
likely to wager more money, then gaining experience may not be in the gambler’s best interest. Risking larger and larger sums of
money without a concomitant increase in the
probability of winning may in fact promote
pathology. Future research should attempt to
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assess the reliability of the present findings in
this regard. That research should also attempt
to explore the mechanism that potentially
leads to increases in bet size with experience.
The second question asked by the present
study was whether players’ behavior would
be differentially controlled by the different
games or whether players would play similarly across the different games. Qualitative
responses suggest that players noted the different contingencies of the different games
and altered their strategies. However, the
quantitative data suggest that players either
did not alter their strategies (and thus their
accuracy varied across the games) or altered
them inappropriately. That is, accuracy rates
were quite low, again averaging less than
70% for all three games.
One could potentially argue that this particular outcome was influenced by the fact
that, although participants were gambling
with actual money, it was not their own money and therefore they did not take the time or
effort to play well. This criticism cannot be
completely refuted. However, there is at least
one argument against it. Specifically, previous research on the “endowment effect” has
demonstrated that when people are gifted
something, they take ownership of it and are
negatively impacted by its loss (e.g., Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990). None of the
present participants expressed surprise when
paid cash at the end of the experiment. That
outcome suggests participants were aware that
they were playing with real money, which
should have promoted the endowment effect.
However, to fully answer this criticism, one
would need to conduct the experiment with
participants risking their own money. For
ethical reasons, such a replication is unlikely.
Given ethical constraints, the present procedure appears to be as close to actual gambling
as possible in the laboratory.
The fact that participants performed so
poorly when playing is troublesome, especially given that video poker is touted (accurately
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so) as one of the most gambler-friendly games
in a casino (e.g., see VideoPokerAdvisor.com). That was indeed the case in the
present study. If participants had played perfectly and bet five credits per play (which
raises one’s overall chances because the Royal flush pays above the standard multiplier
when one places the maximum bet), their rate
of return would have been 99.54, 99.17, and
100.97% for the Jacks-or-Better, Bonus Poker, and Loose Deuces games, respectively.
Played perfectly for an indefinite period,
Loose Deuces is not gambling, it is investing.
However, participants played far from perfectly and actually played the most inaccurately when playing Loose Deuces.
Generalizing laboratory results to naturally
occurring situations should always be done
with caution. However, if allowed to generalize the present results to a casino setting, then
one would surmise that it would be in the casino’s best interest to provide patrons with
experience playing its games even if it comes
at an initial cost to the casino (e.g., staking
players with house money, sponsoring lowcost or free “tournaments”). Doing so would
promote increased wagers in the future that
come with “experience.” It would also be in
the best interest of the casino to introduce variations of games players are already familiar
with but that require different strategies for
accurate play. Even though players might
alter their strategies when playing these new
games, they are unlikely to do so optimally.
For readers familiar with casinos, these generalizations are not likely to seem far fetched.
They are standard practice at many major casinos.
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